We provide a necessary condition that a constrained Nash-equilibrium (CNE) policy pair satisfies in two-person zero-sum constrained stochastic discounted-payoff games and discuss a general method of approximating CNE based on the condition.
Introduction
Altman and Shwartz [1] established a sufficient condition for the existence of a stationary Markovian constrained Nash equilibrium (CNE) policy pair in a general model of finite two-person zero-sum constrained stochastic games and Alvarez-Mena and Hernández-Lerma [2] extended the result for infinite state and action spaces. Even though a few computational studies exist for average-payoff models with additional simplifying assumptions (see, e.g., [3] [4] [5] ), there seems to be no work providing a meaningful necessary condition for CNE or any general approximation scheme for CNE within the general discounting-cost model.
This brief paper establishes a necessary condition that a CNE policy pair satisfies by a novel characterization of the set of all feasible policies of one player when the other player's policy is fixed. This is done by identifying feasible mixed actions of one player at a current state when the expected total discounted constraint cost from each reachable next state is given by a value function defined over the state space. The necessary condition provides a general method of testing whether a given policy pair is a CNE policy pair and can induce a general approximation scheme for CNE.
Preliminaries
Consider a two-person zero-sum Markov game (MG) [6] = ( , , , , ), where is a finite state set, and ( ) and ( ) are nonempty finite pure-action sets for the minimizer and the maximizer, respectively, at in with = ⋃ ∈ ( ) and = ⋃ ∈ ( ). We denote the mixed action sets at in over ( ) and ( ) to be in by the minimizer and the maximizer, respectively (with the complete knowledge of the state but without knowing each other's current action being taken), makes a transition to a next state by the probability given as
Here ( ) denotes the probability of selecting , similar to ( ), and ( | , , ) denotes the probability of moving from to by and . Then the minimizer obtains an expected cost of ( , , ) given by
where ( , , , ) in R is a payoff to the minimizer (the negative of this will be incurred to the maximizer).
We define a stationary Markovian policy of the minimizer as a function :
Game Theory for all ∈ and denote Π to be the set of all possible such policies. A policy is similarly defined for the maximizer with [ ], and we denote Φ to be the set of all possible such policies. Define the objective value of in Π and in Φ with an initial state in as
where is a random variable denoting the state at time by following and , and ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed discounting factor. We let ( , ) = ∑ ∈ ( ) ( , )( ) for a given initial state distribution over .
The MG is associated with constraint functions , = 1, 2, defined over and constraint-cost functions , = 1, 2, where ( , , , ) ∈ R, , ∈ , ∈ ( ), and ∈ ( ), is a constraint-cost paid by the minimizer if = 1 and by the maximizer if = 2. (For simplicity, we consider the model in [1, 2] with only one side constraint for each player.)
A policy in Π is called -feasible with respect to in Φ if the pair of and satisfies the constraint inequality of
The expected constraint cost 1 ( , , ) is given by
Similarly, in Φ is -feasible with respect to
where 2 is defined with 2 and 2 ∈ (0, 1). We say that is feasible with respect to if, for all in , 1 ( , )( ) ≤ 1 ( ), and is feasible with respect to if, for all in , 2 ( , )( ) ≤ 2 ( ). Note that if is feasible with respect to , then is -feasible with respect to for any . Let
That is, Π is the set of all -feasible policies in Π with respect to (when the maximizer's policy is fixed by ); similarly Φ is obtained when the minimizer's policy is fixed by . Then has a constrained Nash equilibrium (CNE) if there exists a pair of * in Π and * in Φ such that * is -feasible with respect to * and * is -feasible with respect to * , and
A Necessary Condition for CNE
Let ( ) be the set of all real-valued functions on . Given in Φ and V in ( ), define -constrained feasible mixed action set with V for the minimizer: for all in ,
We further define -constrained feasible mixed action set with V for the maximizer for in Π and V in ( ): for all in ,
Proof. Consider an operator , : ( ) → ( ) given as
(10)
Then we have that for in R and in
, we have that, for all in ,
The second statement can be proven with the similar symmetrical reasoning.
Some notable examples of choosing V in ( ) for
We now let Proof. We prove only the first part of the statement for the minimizer case. Suppose that is feasible with respect to . Then by setting
and this implies that there exists
For the other direction, if is in ⋃ V∈ ( ) Π ,V , then, for some V ∈ ( ), ( ) is in [ ( )] ,V for all in . By Lemma 1, is feasible with respect to .
Because a policy of one player which is feasible with respect to a policy of the other player is -feasible with respect to the policy of the other player, the following necessary condition satisfied by a CNE policy pair is immediate.
Corollary 3. If a pair of
* in Π and * in Φ is a CNE pair for a given , then the pair satisfies the following saddle-point inequality:
Given a pair of in Π and in Φ, if we find some V, in ( ) such that the pair does not satisfy the saddle-point inequality over nonempty Π ,V and Φ , , then the pair is not a CNE pair.
An Example of Approximation Scheme for CNE
We now provide an example of a general approximation scheme for CNE based on the necessary condition. Basically, we fix some , V in ( ) and try to find an equilibrium policy pair that satisfies the saddle-point inequalities over subsets of the feasible policy spaces induced with the selected , V and the pair, which is an approximate CNE pair. We start with selecting arbitrary V 1 , V 2 in ( ) and define feasible mixed joint-action sets induced with V 1 , V 2 : for all ∈ ,
where denotes the mixed action with ( ) = 1 and with ( ) = 1.
Assume that Δ V 1 ,V 2 ( ) ̸ = 0 for all in . We then obtain a pair of nonempty
and similarly
4 Game Theory That is, ,V ( ) is a -constrained feasible pure-action set with V at for the minimizer and similarly ,V ( ) is for the maximizer. For any subset ( ) ⊆ ( ), ∈ with ⋃ ∈ ( ) = , we denote [ ( )] to be the set of all possible probability distributions over ( ) that have zero probabilities for the actions in ( )\ ( ). If ( ) = 0, then
for all in in general.) We further let
If 
which further implies that, for any
,̃is feasible with respect tõand̃is feasible with respect tõ.
Consider now the unconstrained game
, where and are evaluated only
for all in , and denote the set of all NE policy pairs of V 1 ,V 2 to be NE( V 1 ,V 2 ). The above two results finally imply then that
is a local CNE for . In other words, for any ,̃is -feasible with respect tõand̃is -feasible with respect tõ, and
That is, the local CNE pair (̃,̃) satisfies all of the conditions of CNE except that the saddle-point inequality is satisfied locally for the subsets of Π̃and Φ̃. In fact, related solution concepts for games that are resistant to local deviations, called "local NE, " have been already established in economics (see, e.g., [7] ). Projecting Δ V 1 ,V 2 ( ) into the two sets of Δ V 1 ,V 2 ( ) and Δ V 1 ,V 2 ( ) turns out to be equivalent to obtaining a complete bipartite subgraph or biclique subgraph from a (bipartite) graph. The problem of finding a biclique in a given bipartite graph is well studied in the graph theory literature (see, e.g., [8] ). Another issue is how we set V 1 and V 2 such that Δ V 1 ,V 2 ( ) is nonempty for all in . If there exists a pure-policy pair of in Π and in Φ such that, for all in , ( )( ) = 1 for some ∈ ( ) and ( )( ) = 1 for some ∈ ( ) and one policy is feasible with respect to the other policy, then by setting V = ( , ), = 1, 2, we have ( ( ), ( )) ∈ V 1 ,V 2 ( ) for all in , making Δ V 1 ,V 2 ( ) ̸ = 0 for all in . We can put the following feasibility assumption on to assure the existence of such a pure-policy pair: for all in ,
In other words, by this assumption there exists at least one pure-policy pair such that one policy is feasible with respect to the other policy. The existence comes from the fact that there exists a pure-policy pair ( , ) that achieves inf , 1 ( , )( ) for all in in solving this Markov decision process problem [9] and also for the case of inf , 2 ( , )( ) for all in .
To illustrate how the above method works, we consider the following simple MG = ( , , , , ), where = {1, 2}, ( ) = ( ) = { , }, ∀ ∈ , and , , 1 , and 2 are given in terms of a matrix form, respectively: ]. In this matrix form, for example, the ( , )th entries of and refer to ( | , , ) and ( , , , ), respectively. The other parameters are given such that = 1 = 0.9, 2 = 0.95, 1 (1) = 2 (1) = 40, and 1 (2) = 2 (2) = 50.
We first observe that, for the pure-policy pair ( , ) = (( , ), ( , )), one policy is feasible with respect to the other policy. The notation of = ( (1), (2)) here refers to (1) ∈ [ (1)] and (2) ∈ [ (2)]. For simplicity, we write (1) as for the distribution concentrated on the action . (Note that we can obtain another such pure-policy pair (( , ), ( , )) which achieves inf ∈Π, ∈Φ 1 ( , )( ) = 2, ∀ ∈ .) Now, by setting V = ( , ), = 1, 2, we first obtain Δ V 1 ,V 2 ( ) = {( , ), ( , )}, for all ∈ , thereby having the sets of Δ V 1 ,V 2 ( ) = { } and Δ V 1 ,V 2 ( ) = { , }, for all ∈ . We solve the unconstrained two-person zero-sum MG V 1 ,V 2 , obtaining a pure NE policy pair of (̃,̃) = (( , ), ( , )) for V 1 ,V 2 , which is then a local CNE for .
Concluding Remark
For simplicity, the model of the present note deals with only one side constraint for each player. Generalization of this into multiple side constraints per player would make the definitions complex, but the ideas must be the same to the one side-constraint case.
